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WIRETAPPING: THE STATE LAW*
Prior to the invention of the telegraph in 1884,
interception of communications was, except for
the occasional purloined letter, the work of the
eavesdropper. With the advent of the telegraph
wire, however, a new form of eavesdropping was
devised-wiretapping. Although eavesdropping
and wiretapping have much in common, it was
not long before state courts distinguished the two
and began to treat them differently.' Although
* This paper is one of a series dealing with the law of
wiretapping. The first paper in the series, which was
entitled Wiretapping: The Federal Law, appeared at
51 J. Cans. L., C. & P.S. 441 (1960).
1 "Eavesdropping" was defined under the common
law as the "listening under walls or windows or the
eaves of a house to hearken after discourse and there-
upon frame slanderous and mischievous tales." In re
Lanza, 163 N.Y.S.2d 576. 579, 6 Misc.2d 411, 412
(1957); 4 BLACKSTOXE, Co-mEs"rAPIES 168; State v.
Pennington, 40 Tenn. 299, 300, 75 Am.Dec. 771, 772
(1859), citing 2 BIsHoP, CRIMINAL LAw 274.
"Wiretapping" apparently was not defined by the
common law, but it presumably meant the taking of
messages from a wire in order to learn their nature and
content. One might, of course, tap a wire without learn-
ing the contents of any messages. If this is the case the
conversants probably cannot complain, assuming their
privacy was not thereby invaded. It seems that the
prohibition against "wiretapping" was generally under-
stood to include the prohibition against learning the
contents of the messages. Also, it might be noted that if
the tap required a touching of the wire, the telephone
or telegraph companies conceivably could commence
an action of trespass, though no case on this point has
been found.
the eavesdropper could be held for both a crime 2
and a tort,3 the wiretapper, under the common
law, was liable only in tort, namely, for the inva-
sion of the right of privacy.
4
2 State v. Williams, 2 Tenn. 108 (1808); State v.
Pennington, 40 Tenn. 299, 75 Am. Dec. 771 (1859).
3 McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60
Ga.App. 92, 2 S.E.6d 810 (1939). This was a civil case
where earphones were used to overhear and record the
conversations of the plaintiff with her husband, doctor,
and nurses. The court held that this was eavesdropping
and constituted an invasion of the plaintiff's privacy
even though plaintiff had given the defendant per-
mission to make any investigation he saw fit into the
validity of her claim.
In some criminal cases, however, eavesdropping has
not been found to constitute an invasion of the right of
privacy. People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal.App.2d 435, 308
P.2d 821 (1957); People v. Malotte, 46 Cal.2d 59, 292
P.2d 517 (1956).
For a discussion of the right of privacy doctrine, see
Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga.
190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
4 Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46
(1931). It is noteworthy that the court dealt only with
the right of privacy issue, disregarding the plaintiff's
contention that the wiretapping constituted a trespass
to the telephone line and other property attached
thereto which the plaintiff allegedly leased. Apparently
no other court has ever determined whether wiretapping
is a trespass, probably because, as in Rhodes v. Graham,
the case was disposed of as an invasion of the right of
privacy.
In accord with the Rhodes case is McDaniel v.
Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga.App. 92, 2
S.E.2d 810 (1939). Compare, however, Ladrey v. Com-
mission of Licensure to Practice Healing Art, 261 F.2d
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The early court decisions dealing with wire-
tapping were little affected by legislation, but as
the communications system swiftly developed
throughout the country, the various state legisla-
tures were persuaded by the telegraph and tele-
phone companies to take action regarding the
frequent destruction of company property. As a
result, the states, with three possible exceptions,5
enacted legislation prohibiting malicious and mis-
chievous injury to telegraph and telephone lines.
6
68 (D.C.Cir. 1958), cerl. denied, 358 U.S. 920 (1958),
where the court, citing Rathbun v. United States, 355
U.S. 107 (1957), held that each party to a telephone
conversation takes the risk that the other party may
use an extension telephone and allow another to over-
hear the conversation and that when this takes place
there is no actionable violation of privacy interests.
Furthermore, the court held that this does not consti-
tute wiretapping nor does it violate the statutes pro-
hibiting interception and divulgence.
For a discussion of the right of privacy doctrine and
an enumeration of the states which recognize it, see
PROSSER, TORTS §97 (2d ed. 1955).
In those states which have adopted the right of
privacy doctrine, only one case has been found which
holds that wiretapping does not constitute an invasion
of that right. In Commonwealth v. Voci, 185 Pa. Super.
563, 138 A. 2d 232 (1958), the court held that a person
engaged in the commission of a crime has no legal right
of privacy and, therefore, testimony based on wire-
tapping is not rendered inadmissible as an invasion of an
individual's right of privacy.
5 Hawaii, Louisiana, and Massachusetts.
6 ALA. CODE tit. 14, §84 (1958) & ALA. Code tit. 48,
§415 (1958); ALASKA Con. LAws ANN. §49-5-12
(1949); Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. 13-885 (1956); ARK.
STAT. ANN. §73-1810 (1957); CAL. PEN. CODE §591;
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §40-4-17 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. §53-124 (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11,
§754 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. §822.10 (Supp. 1959);
GA. CODE ANN. §26-8114 (1953) & GA. CODE ANN.
§26-3805 (Supp. 1958); Hawaii-none-but cf. HAwAII
REV. LAWS §296-14 (1955) (tampering with electrical
equipment); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 134, §§14 & 15a (1959);
I.D. ANN. STAT. §10-4518 (1956); IowA CODE ANN.
§716.7 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§17-1907 &
17-1908 (1949); Ky. REv. STAT. §433.430 (1958); Loui-
siana-none; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 131, §16 (1954);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §§323 & 326 (1957); Massa-
chusetts-none; MicH. STAT. ANN. §§28.808 &
28.615(1) (1954); MInm. STAT. ANN. §621.28 (1947);
Miss. CODE ANN. §2381 (1957); Mo. ANN,. STAT.
§560.310 (1953); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §94-3203
(1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§86-309 & 86-328 (1958);
NEV. REv. STAT. §707.310 (1959); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §572:3 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§2A:146-1 &
2A:146-2 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-37-5 (1953);
N.Y. PEN. §1423; N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-154 (1953);
N.D. REv. CODE §8-1008 (1943); Omio REv. CODE
ANN §§4931.25 & 4931.28 (Baldwin 1958); OKLA. STAT.
AN N . tit. 21, §§1757 & 1786 (1958); ORE. Rev. STAT.
§§164.510, 164.630, & 165.540 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §4916 (1945); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANNi. §11-35-4
(1956); S.C. CODE §58-316 (1952); S.D. CODE §13.4520
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §§39-4533 & 65-2117 (1955);
TEX. PEN. CODE art. 1334 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN.
Most of the states, in addition, enacted legislation
prohibiting the willful and malicious prevention,
obstruction, or delay of the transmission of any
message over such lines.7 But the purpose of these
statutes was primarily to prevent damage to
property and interference with service. Since wire-
tapping does not generally injure a wire nor in-
terrupt the communication, prosecutions for inter-
ceptions of messages under these statutes were
rare.8
§76-48-13 (1953); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, §2528 (1958);
VA. CODE ANN. §18-214 (1950); WASH. REV. CODE
§90.32.020 (1959); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5970 (1955);
WIs. STAT. ANN. §134.39 (1957); Wvyo. Con'. STAT.
AN,. §§37-258 & 37-259 (1957).
A typical example of one of these statutes is N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. §572:3 (1955) which provides:
"If any person shall wilfully, wantonly or ma-
liciously injure, destroy or damage any ... posts,
wires or other materials or fixtures of any ... public
telegraph or telephone line ... he shall be fined not
more than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both."
7ALA. CODE tit. 14, §84 (1958); ALASKcA Com'. LAWS
ANN. §49-5-12 (1949); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-885
(1956); Arkansas-none; California-none; CoLo. REv.
STAT. ANN. §40-4-17 (1953); Connecticut-none; DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, §754 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§822.10 (Supp. 1959); GA. CODE ANN. §26-3805 (Supp.
1958); Hawaii-none; IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6705
(1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 134, §15a (1959); Indiana-
none; Iowa-none; Kansas-none; Ky. REv. STAT.
§433.430 (1958); Louisiana-none; Maine-none;
Maryland-none, Massachusetts-none, Mica. STAT.
ANN. §28.808 (1954); Minnesota-none; Miss. CODE
ANN. §2381 (1957); Missouri-none; MONT. REv.
CODES ANN. §94-3203 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. §86-328
(1958); NEV. REv. STAT. §§707.310 & 707.320 (1959);
New Hampshire-none; N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:146-2
(1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-37-5 (1953); N.Y. PEN
§1423; North Carolina-none; N. D. REv. CODE § 8-1007
(1943); Osno REV. CODE ANN. §4931,28 (Baldwin
1958); Oklahoma-none; ORE. RE V. STAT. §§164.510
&164.630 (1959); Pennsylvania-none; Rhode Island-
none; South Carolina-none; S.D. CODE §13.4519 (1939);
TENN. CODE ANN. §65-2117 (1955); TEx. PEN. CODE
art. 1334 (1948); Utah-none; Vermont-none; VA.
CODE ANN. §18-214 (1950); Washington-none; West
Virginia-none; Wis. STAT. ANN. §134.39 (1957);
W'o. Comp'. STAT. ANN. §37-259 (1957).
A typical example of one of these statutes is N. M.
STAT. ANN. §40-37-5 (1953) which provides:
"Any person...'who wilfully and maliciously
prevents, obstructs or delays by any means or con-
trivance whatsoever, the sending, transmission,
conveyance or delivery in this state of any message
... (shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and will be
fined not less than S300.00 nor more than S1,000.00
and/or imprisioned not over 1 year]."
sThe courts have been somewhat hesitant to bring
wiretapping under the malicious mischief statutes since
penal statutes have usually been strictly construed.
In State v. Turley, 100 N.H. 267, 125 A.2d 774
(1956), the court made special note of the fact that the
statute in New Hampshire prohibiting damage to the
property of a public utility does not prohibit wiretap-
1961]
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Realizing this legislation to be inadequate to
cope with the growing problem of wiretapping,
the majority of states gradually enacted statutes
directed specifically at wiretappers who tapped
lines for the purpose of intercepting messages.9
ping. Also see, State v. Nordskog, 76 Wash. 472,136
Pac 694 (1913).
Wiretapping would be punishable only if it resulted
incidentally in physical damage or interference with
service in the manner prescribed. Southwestern Tele-
graph & Telephone Co. v. Priest, 31 Civ. App. 345,
72 S.W. 241 (1903); Young v. Young, 56 R.I. 401, 185
Atl. 901 (1936).
9 ALA. CODE tit. 48, §414 (1958); ALAsKA Comp.
LAWS ANN. §49-5-12 (1949); Arizona-none; ARK.
STAT. ANN. §73-1810 (1957); CAL. PEN. CODE §640;
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §40-417 (1953); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REV. §53-140 (1958); DEL. CODE AN-,N. tit.
11, §757 (Supp. 1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. §822.10
(Supp. 1959); Georgia-none; Hawaii-none; IDAHo
CODE ANN. §§18-6704 & 18-6705 (1948); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 134, §15a (1959) & ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§§206.1 to 206.5 (1959) (eavesdropping includes wire-
tapping); Indiana-none; IOwA CODE ANN. §716.8
(1950); Kansas-none; Ky. REV. STAT. §433.430 (1958);
LA. REv. STAT. §14:322 (1950); Maine-none; MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, §§92 & 93 (1957); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 272, §99 (Supp. 1959) (eavesdropping includes
wiretapping); Mico. . STAT. ANN. §28.808 (1954);
Minnesota-none; Mississippi-none; Missouri-none;
MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. §§94-3203 & 94-35-220
(1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §86-328 (1958); NEV. REV.
STAT. §707.320 (1959); New Hampshire-none; N.J.
STAT. ANN. §2A:146-1 (1953); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40-37-
5 (1953); N.Y. PEN. §738 (eavesdropping includes
wiretapping); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-155 (1953); N.D.
REV. CODE §8-1007 (1943); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§4931.28 (Baldwin 1958); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§1757 (1958); ORE. REV. STAT. §165.540 (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2443 (1958); R.I. GEN. LAws
ANN. §11-35-12 (1956); South Carolina-none; S.D.
CODE §13.4519 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. §65-2117
(1955); Texas-none; UTAIr CODE ANN. §76-48-11 (1953);
Vermont-none; VA. CODE ANN. §18-214 (1950);
Washington-none; West Virginia-none; Wis. STAT.
ANN. §134.39 (1957); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. §37-259
(1945).
An example of one of these statutes is UTAH CODE
ANN. §76-48-11 (1953) which provides:
"Every person who wilfully and fraudulently, or
clandestinely, taps or makes any unauthorized con-
nection by any means whatever, with any telegraph
or telephone wire, line, cable.., or wilfully and
fraudulently, or clandestinely, reads or attempts to
read, or learns the contents or meaning of any
message, report or communication, by means of
any machine, instrument or contrivance, or in any
unauthorized manner, while such message, report or
communication is in transit or passing over any
telegraph or telephone wire, line or cable, or is
being sent from or received at any place within this
state; ... is punishable ......
The fifteen states which have not enacted such
statutes must, of course, resort to the common law
when handling cases involving wiretapping.
Wiretapping is usually made a misdemeanor, though
at least three states classify it as a felony: IDAHO CODE
ANN. §18-6705 (1948); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§37-259 (1945); N.Y. PEN. §740.
Unlike the malicious mischief statutes mentioned
above, 0 which protect the means of communica-
tion, these wiretapping statutes prohibit unwar-
ranted intrusions into the privacy of the conver-
sants."
Courts have interpreted these statutes as pro-
hibiting the taking or seizure of a communication
during its transmission by wire.'2 On the other
hand, "the obtaining of what is to be sent before,
or at the moment, it leaves the possession of the
proposed sender, or after, or at the moment, it
comes into the possession of the intended receiver,"
is presumably always considered "eavesdropping""3
The punishments vary among the statutes with the
highest fine being one thousand dollars and the longest
jail term, five years. The judge is usually given the
discretion to set the sentence within certain prescribed
limits.
For a unique statute prohibiting the possession of
eavesdropping equipment, see N.Y. PEN. §742.
10 Supra notes 6 & 7.
11 People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d 817
(1959); People v. Appelbaum, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 277
App. Div. 43 (1950), af'd, 301 N.Y. 738, 95 N.E.2d
410 (1950).
12State v. Behringer, 19 Ariz. 502, 504-505, 172
Pac. 660, 661 (1918); People v. Malotte, 46 Cal.2d 59,
63, 292 P.2d 517, 520 (1956).
J3 People v. Malotte, 46 Cal.2d 59, 64, 292 P.2d
517, 520 (1956) (where the court, citing Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), held that there was
no "interception" within the meaning of the Federal
Communications Act, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C.
§605 (1959), and no invasion of privacy in violation of
CAL. PEN. CODE §640 where a conversation was re-
corded, by means of an induction coil, at the moment
it reached the intended receiver); State v. Behringer,
19 Ariz. 502, 172 Pac. 660 (1918) (where the placing of
a dictograph over the transom of a hotel room in order
to overhear messages sent from a telephone in the room
was eavesdropping and not an offense within a statute
prohibiting wiretapping); State v. Vanderhave, 47
N.J.Super. 483, 136 A.2d 296 (1957) (where the court
held that the covert listening to a telephone conversa-
tion through an extension telephone or switchboard was
eavesdropping and did not come within the compass of
the wiretapping statute) (accord, State v. Giardina,
27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609 (1958) (similar facts)).
Also see: Commonwealth v. Smith, 180 Pa. Super.
89, 140 A.2d 347 (1958) (where the court held that there
was no interception when a police officer during a raid
answered defendant's phone and heard the caller
placing bets); Griffith v. State, 111 So.2d 282 (Fla.App.
1959) (where the court held that a police investigator
was not wiretapping when he tapped his own telephone
and thereby was able to record what the defendant
said over the party line) (accord, Williams v. State,
109 So.2d 379 (Fla. App. 1959)) (contra, Tollin v.
State, 46 Del. 120, 78 A.2d 810 (1951)).
Whether one who impersonates the intended receiver
when answering the telephone is guilty of interception
is a question which has not been definitely decided




and in the majority of states is not prohibited by
statute.'
4
Many statutes, in addition to forbidding the
interception of messages, make punishable the
disclosure or divulgence of messages. 5 With one
14 Some states, however, have expanded the scope of
their Wiretap statutes to include eavesdropping. N.Y.
PEN. §738; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §§206.1 to 206.5
(Smith-Hurd 1960).
"5 Statutes making the divulgence or disclosure of
wiretap information punishable: (asterisk indicates a
statute which merely makes divulgence or disclosure
by telegraph and telephone company employees punish-
able) ALA. CODE tit. 48, §§414, 416,* & 417* (1958);
ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. §49-5-14 (1949); ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. §13-887 (1956); ARK STAT. ANN.
§73-1812 (1957)*; CAL. PeN. CODE §640; Colorado-
none; CONN GEN. STAT. REv. §53-140 (1958)*; DEL.
CODE: AwN. tit. 11, §§756* & 757 (Supp. 1958); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §822.10 (Supp. 1959); Georgia-none;
Hawaii-none; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§18-6703* & 18-6706
(1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 134, §8 (1959)* & Iii REv.
STAT. ch. 38, §206.4 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §10-4901
(1956)*; Iowa-none; Kansas-none; Kentucky-none;
LA. REv. STAT. §14:320 (1950)*; ME. REV. STAT. AN.
ch. 50, 34 (1954)*; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §324
(1957)* & MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §92 (1957); Massa-
chusetts-none; Micr. STAT. ANN. §28.807 (1954)*;
MiNN. STAT. ANN. §620.65 (1947)*; Miss. CODE. A N.
§2382 (1957)*; Mo. ANN. STAT. §392.170 (1957)*;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-3321 (1949); Nebraska-
none; NEv. REv. STAT. §§200.630 & 200.650 (1959);
New Hampshire-none; N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:146-1
(1953); New Mexico-none; N.Y. PEN. §743*; N.C.
GEN. STAT. §14-370 (1953)*; N.D. REv. CODE §8-1009
(1943)*; Omo REV. CODE ANN. §4931.29 (Baldwin
1958)*; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1782 (1958); ORa.
REv. STAT. §165.540 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§2443 (1958) & PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4688 (1945)*;
Rhode Island-none; South Carolina-none; S.D. CODE
§§13.4511 & 52.1319* (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
§65-2115 (1955)*; TEx. PEN. CODE art. 335 (1948)*;
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-48-6 (1953); Vermont-none;
Virginia-none; Washington-none; West Virginia-none;
Wis. STAT. ANN. §134.36 & 134.37 (1957)*; Wyo.
Con'. STAT. ANN. §37-259 (1957)*.
An example of one of these statutes is DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, §757 (Supp. 1958) which provides:
"Whoever reads, takes copy, makes use of, dis-
closes, publishes or testifies concerning any dispatch
or message, communication or report intended for
another passing over such telegraph or telephone
line, wire, or cable, in this state:... Shall for each
such offense, be fined not less than $500 or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both. .. "
Usually disclosure or divulgence is made a misde-
meanor. (Although the various statutes use both the
terms "disclosure" and "divulgence", no case has been
found distinguishing the meanings of the two words.)
Although all the statutes mentioned in this note make
disclosure or divulgence punishable, it is not clear
whether disclosure or divulgence in court is punishable
as well as disclosure or divulgence out of court. Only a
few statutes clearly prohibit testifying as to wiretap
information, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §757 (Supp.
1958) & N. J. STAT. ANN. §2A:146-1 (1953). These two
statutes would even seem to make disclosure or divul-
gence upon court order punishable, while some of the
other statutes only impliedly make disclosure or divulg-
ence upon court order punishable.
possible exception,1 6 it is not necessary under
these statutes that divulgence be coupled with
interception in order for wiretapping to be punish-
able. Interception and divulgence are separate
crimes.
17
Although the majority of states today have
statutes proscribing or making punishable the
interception or divulgence of messages, it is inter-
esting to note that, despite the tremendous amount
of wiretapping reportedly done every day,5 there
evidently have been very few wiretap prosecutions
and convictions.' 9 The scarcity of prosecutions and
convictions is not surprising, however, since those
prosecuting have very probably been intimately
involved themselves with either the act of wire-
tapping or evidence derived thereby. 0 Then too,
until recently, police officers were not prosecuted
in some states since it was thought that the wire-
tap statutes did not apply to them." Furthermore,
the act of wiretapping rarely becomes known unless
evidence obtained thereby is introduced in court.
Another reason for the scarcity of prosecutions
Some statutes specifically provide that disclosure or
divulgence is not punishable if made pursuant to a
court order: (asterisk denotes a statute which only
permits disclosure or divulgence by telegraph and tele-
phone employees upon court order) ALA. CODE tit. 48,
§417 (1940)*; Auuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §13-887 (1956);
IND. ANN. STAT. §104901 (1956)*; LA. Rxv. STAT.
§14:320 (1950)*; MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, §324 (1957)*;
Mi. ANN. CODE art. 35, §92 (1957); MoNT. REV. CODES
ANN. §94-3321 (1949); NaV. REv. STAT. §§200.630 &
200.650 (1959); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1782
(1958) (allows disclosure by anyone upon court order
and by police officers at any time).
Some of the statutes make "willful divulgence"
punishable, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §73-1812 (1957) &
IDAHO CODE ANN. §18-6706 (1948). But what is "willful
divulgence?" Do these statutes imply that divulgence
upon court order is not punishable?
1
6 MD. ANNt. CODE art. 35, §92 (1957):
"The interception and divulgence of a private
communication by any person not a party thereto is
contrary to the public policy of this State." [Em-
phasis added.]
37 Some states prohibit both interception and divulg-
ence, while others, such Arizona and Colorado, only
prohibit one or the other. Compare notes 9 & 15 supra.
18 DASH, SCHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROP-
PEAs, 23-34 (1959); Westin, The Wiretapping Problem:
An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLum. L.
Rxv. 165, 167-172 (1952). But for a contrary opinion
as to the frequency of police wiretapping, see Brown,
The Great Wiretapping Debate and the Crisis in Law
Enforcement, 6 N.Y.L.F. 265, 270-272 (1960).
19 Rosenzweig, The Law of Wiretapping, 33 Coiumri
L. Q. 73, 75 (1947). Court decisions on the matter are
few in number.
20 Westin, The Wiretapping Problem: An Analysis and
a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLu.. L. REv. 165, 167-
172 (1952).
21 For a discussion of this situation, see Savarese,
Eavesdropping and the Law, 46 A B.A.J. 263, 265 (1960).
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for wiretapping may be the notion that it is unjust
to prosecute a wiretapper after he has aided the
prosecution by securing wiretap evidence which
would convict some nefarious criminal22 Argument
can also be made that since the law allows searches
and seizures under certain conditions, as well as
police informers and spies, then wiretapping, which
is simply another weapon employed to protect
society, should also be allowed. As a result, many
of the statutes are considered idealistic, but im-
practical-to be admired, but not necessarily
followed.
Although many states' statutes unequivocally
prohibit wiretappingN at least one jurisdiction
indirectly authorizes law enforcement officers to
use wiretapping as a police weapon.24 Louisiana's
statute specifically exempts officers of the law and
imposes no express control over wiretapping done
by them, though a good faith test may be implied.
No consent is required from a court or district
attorney. Any law enforcement officer, without a
court order, may install a wiretap "for the pur-
pose of obtaining information to detect crime."
Some states, dissatisfied with statutes com-
pletely prohibiting wiretapping, and at the same
time unwilling to give police officers unbridled
discretion in its use, have attempted to strike a
balance between society's interest in the capture
and conviction of criminals and the individual's
right of privacy. Approximately twenty-six states,
some perhaps inadvertently,25 will allow wire-
22 There are those of course who consider the pro-
tection of one's right of privacy as paramount, even if
it means letting a few criminals escape punishment.
23Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Montana, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
and Wisconsin. For specific citations see note 9 supra.
2
14 LA. REv. STAT. §14:322 (1950):
"No person shall tap or attach any devices for
the purpose of listening in on wires, cables, or
property owned and used by any person, for the
transmission of intelligence by magnetic telephone
or telegraph, without the consent of the owner.
"... This section shall not be construed to prevent
officers of the law, while in the actual discharge of
their duties, from tapping in on wires or cables for
the purpose of obtaining information to detect
crime."
Perhaps OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1757 (1958) also
authorizes police officers to wiretap, for the statue allows
wiretapping by those with "legal authority." The
statute does not define what it means by "legal author-
ity," however. Hence, it may mean "legal authority to
wiretap,' or simply "any kind of legal authority,"
which would include police officers.
25 Many statutes merely state that "Every person
who. - . makes any unauthorized connection.., is
punishable.... ." While some of these statutes go on to
provide that wiretapping is permissible when author-
tapping if "authorized. 2 6 Not all of these states'
statutes define what is meant by "authorization,"
but there are those which explain the term in
detail.
ized by court order or by one or both of the conversants,
others fail to spell out any procedure whereby one
may obtain the required "authority." See note 26 infra.
26 ALA. CODE tit. 48, 414 (1958) (consent of owner
or lessor required); ArsA Comp. LAws ANN. §49-5-14
(1949) (consent of owner required); Ax. STAT. ANN.
§73-1810 (1957) ("authority" required); CAL. PFN.
CODE §§591 & 640 ("unauthorized connections"
prohibited); CoNN. GEN. STAT. RaV. §53-140 (1958)
(consent of owner or lessor required; statute only
prohibits listening to "messages to which he is not
entitled"); FLA. STAT. ANN. §866.10 (Supp. 1959)
(consent of owner required); IHxo CoDE ANN.
§18-6705 (1948) (prohibits wiretapping done in "any
unauthorized manner;" consent of either sender or
receiver required); ItL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §206.1
(1959) (consent of either sender or receiver required);
IowA CODE ANN. §716.8 (1950) (prohibits wiretapping
only if "wrongful and unlawful"); LA. REv. STAT.
§14.322 (1950) (consent of owner required unless
wiretapper is a police officer); MiD. ANN. CODE art. 35,
§§93 to 96 (1957) (court order or consent of both
sender and receiver required); MASs. ANN. LAWS ch.
272, §99 (Supp. 1959) (court order or consent of either
sender or receiver required); MicH. STAT. ANN. §68.808
(1954) (prohibits wiretapping done "in any unauthor-
ized manner"); NEB. REv. STAT. §86-328 (1958) (pro-
hibits wiretapping done in any "unauthorized man-
ner"); NEv. REv. STAT. §§200.660 & 200.670 (1959)
(court order or consent of both sender and receiver
required); N.Y. CODE CiRuz. Pxoc. §§813a & 813b
& N.Y. CoDE Ci=. . Pioc. §738 & N. Y. PEN. §739
(court order or consent of either sender or receiver
required); N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-155 (1953) (consent
of person or corporation operating wire required);
OHio REv. CoDE AiN. §4931.28 (Baldwin 1958)
(prohibits wiretapping done in an "unauthorized
manner"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §1757 (1958)
(wiretapping allowed if done with "legal authority");
OaE. REv. STAT. §§141.720 & 165.540 (1959) (court
order or consent of either sender or receiver required);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2443 (1958) (consent of both
sender and receiver required); S.D. CODE §13.4519
(1939) (wiretapping prohibited if "unauthorized");
TENN. CODE ANN. §65-2117 (1955) (consent of owner
required); UTAH CODE ANN. §§76-48-6 & 76-48-11
(1953) (consent of receiver required); VA. CODE ANN.
§18-214 (1950) (wiretapping prohibited if done in an
"unauthorized manner"); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§37-259 (1957) (wiretapping prohibited if done in an
"unauthorized manner").
See United States v. Hill. 149 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. N.Y.
1957), where the court held that each party to a con-
versation is a sender, as well as a receiver, whose consent
is required before the conversation may be divulged by
the person intercepting it.
In at least three cases the question has arisen whether
a subscriber may tap his own telephone when other
parties are using it. In People v. Trieber, 28 Cal.2d
657, 171 P.2d 1 (1946), the court held that a subscriber
could not tap his telephone line except with the consent
of the telephone company. But in People v. Appel-
baum, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, 277 App.Div. 43, af'd, 301
N.Y. 738, 95 N.E.2d 410 (1950), the court reached an
opposite result, holding that a subscriber could tap
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Under the Maryland statute, for example, one
finds that "authorization" means the obtaining
of a court order allowing interception.Y Such orders
are issuable by a judge upon the verified applica-
tion of the Attorney General, any State's Attorney,
or any "duly constituted" police officer. The
application must set forth the facts and circum-
stances upon which the request for a court order
is based and must also aver: (1) that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has
been committed or is about to be committed;
(2) that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that evidence will be obtained essential to the
solution of, or which may enable the prevention
of, such crime; and (3) that there are no other
means readily available for obtaining such infor-
mation. The application and any order issued
must identify as fully as possible the particular
telephone or telegraph line from which informa-
tion is to be obtained. Once the order is issued, it
is effective for a limited period of time, but may
be renewed upon expiration.
A similar statute is in effect in New York,n
his own telephone line to determine whether it was
being used to his detriment. As a result of this case,
private investigators were, in many situations, able to
tap with fewer restrictions than law officers. New York
subsequently amended its statute to prohibit wiretap-
ping by anyone except on court order or upon the
consent of the sender or receiver. N.Y. CODE CRim.
PRoc. §813a & N.Y. PEN. §738. In neither case did
the court seem to concern itself with the conversants'
rights of privacy. In a third case, State v. Giardina,
27 N.J. 313, 318-319, 142 A.2d 609, 611 (1958), the
court stated:
"We find it difficult to believe that Congress
intended to assure privacy to conspirators brazenly
employing a subscriber's facilities to pillage him.
Congress could hardly have intended a sanctuary
for criminals within the home or plant of their
victim....
... [O]ne who uses a subscriber's phone to mulct
him takes the risk of detection."
The court held that a business enterprise could, through
one of its employees, monitor its switchboard in order
to protect itself from suspected unlawful activities.
The court further held, however, that the switchboard
operator, by listening to the conversations of the con-
spiring employees, was eavesdropping and did not act
in violation of state or federal wiretap statutes.
The wording of some statutes seems to condone
wiretapping by a subscriber. See CON. GEN. STAT.
REV. §53-140 (1958).
2 Mo. ANN. CODE art. 35, §94 (1957). A similar
statute in Massachusetts was held not to deny due
process or equal protection of the laws. Commonwealth
v. Publicover, 327 Mass. 303, 98 N.E.2d 633 (1951).
28 N.Y. CODE CRan. PRoc. §813a.
The New York Statute further provides that a
court order permitting "eavesdropping" (which includes
"wiretapping" in New York) is not necessary if two
conditions are met: (1) that evidence of crime may be
but since the case of Benanti v. United States,29
the usefulness of these limited wiretapping statutes
has been somewhat clouded. In the Benanti case,
the United States Supreme Court held that wiretap
evidence obtained in compliance with the New
York Statute was not admissible in federal courts.
Furthermore, the Court in effect stated that Con-
gress, through § 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act,30 had proscribed all state-authorized
forms of wiretapping, and had therefore invali-
dated all statutes permitting wiretapping. 3' This
case has caused some New York judges to cease
issuing wiretap orders,n but because wiretap evi-
thus obtained, and (2) that in order to obtain such
evidence time does not permit an application to be
made. The statute provides, however, that an order
must be sought within eight hours after the eavesdrop-
ping has commenced. N.Y. CODE Caiu. PRoc. §813b.
29 355 U.S. 96 (1958).
3' 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §605 (1959).
31 The Supreme Court in Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96 (1958) at 105 & 106 stated:
... [K]eeping in mind this comprehensive scheme
of interstate regulation and the public policy under-
lying Section 605 as part of that scheme, we find
that Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain
terms, did not mean to allow state legislation which
would contradict that section and that policy."
32Soon after the Benanti case, New York Supreme
Court Justice Samuel H. Hofstadter, long a critic of
warranted wiretapping, with no case before him never-
theless issued an opinion announcing that he could no
longer issue wiretap orders. In the Matter of Inter-
ception of Telephone Communications, 9 Misc.2d 121,
170 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1958). Justice Hofstadter stated that
the United' States Supreme Court decision prevented
issuance of any order for wiretapping and that this
decision was controlling in the states by virtue of the
supremacy clause in the federal constitution. For a simi-
lar opinion rendered by another New York lower court
judge, see Application for Order Permitting Intercep-
tion of Telephone Communications, 198 N.Y.S.2d 572
(1960).
Though not involving a wiretap order, the recent
case of People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.2d
817 (1959), indicates that the New York Court of
Appeals takes a somewhat different view. In that case,
it was argued on behalf of Broady, a private detective
accused of wide-scale wiretapping operations, that
Congress, in enacting §605, had completely pre-empted
the wiretap field and therefore the New York pro-
hibition against wiretapping offended the supremacy
clause of the federal constitution. The Court of Appeals
concluded, however, that ".... [O]ur Penal Law...
[punishing] the conscious and deliberate tapping of
telephones within the State ... does not offend the
supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution."
Assuming arguendo that the New York Statute,
insofar as it authorized wiretapping, did impinge on the
Federal Statute, the Court went on to decide that the
scheme of federal regulation was not so pervasive as
to make unreasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the states to supplement it.
The only definite thing decided by the Broady case
is that a state may punish wiretapping. The case does
not explicitly decide that court orders for wiretapping
1961]
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dence is still admissible in state courts, by virtue
of the Schwartz decision, most of the judges ap-
parently will still issue wiretap orders, even though
this conduct is seemingly in conflict with the
Benanti case.
A problem related to the legality of the act of
wiretapping is the use which can be made of the
evidence derived thereby. While only about three
state supreme courts have held that information
obtained by wiretapping is admissible in evidence,-4
only one state supreme court has held that wiretap
information is not admissible in evidence.3 5 Only
seven state statutes deal with the evidentiary
problem, four providing that wiretap evidence is
inadmissible and the other three providing that
wiretap evidence is admissible under certain con-
ditions if obtained pursuant to a court order.36
are valid, though it is clear from the lengthy dictum
in the opinion that the court was sympathetic toward
state regulated wiretapping. As a result, New York
courts have continued to issue orders for wiretapping
to police officers in substantial numbers.
For a discussion of the Broady and Benanti cases,
see Savarese, Eavesdropping and the Law, 46 A.B.A.J.
263 (1960).
3 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
U White v. State, 204 Md. 442, 104 A.2d 810 (1954);
Application for Order Permitting Interception of
Telephone Communication of Anonymous, 207 Misc.
69, 136 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1955); State v. Steadman,
216 S.C. 579, 59 S.E.2d 168 (1950); Griffith v. State,
111 So.2d 282, 287 (Fla. App. 1959) (dictum).
For the admissibility of evidence procured through
eavesdropping, see DeLore v. Smith, 67 Ore. 304, 136
Pac. 13 (1913). Although the court condemned eaves-
dropping as "despicable," it nevertheless admitted the
evidence procured thereby.
15Tollin v. State, 46 Del. 120, 78 A.2d 810 (1951).
Also see People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955) (evidence procured through eavesdropping
excluded).36 Inadmissible: IIL. REv. STAT. ch.38, §206.3 (1959);
PA. STAT. AN. tit. 15, §2443 (1958) (supersedes Com-
monwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955),
which held that wiretap information was admissible
in evidence); R.I. GEx. LAws ANN. §11-35-13 (1956);
TEX. PEN. Con art. 727a (1948) Admissible: MD.
ANN. CODE art. 35, §97 (1957); NEv. REv. STAT.
§200.680 (1959); ORE. REv. STAT. §41.910 (1959).
It is true that approximately thirty-three states
have statutes making the divulgence of intercepted
messages punishable, but it is not clear, except perhaps
for Delaware and New Jersey, whether divulgence in
court is made punishable. See note 15 supra. Further-
more, even though a state wiretap statute may seem-
ingly make divldgence punishable in any situation, in
court or out of court, with or without the consent of
the conversants, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §640 & FLA.
STAT. ANN. §866.50 (Supp. 1959), this does not mean
that the statute prohibits divulgence in court or excludes
any wiretap information submitted in evidence. Hence,
divulgence may be punishable, but the wiretap informa-
tion divulged may nevertheless be admitted in evidence.
In Florida, for example, FLA STAT. ANN. §822.10
(Supp. 1959), provides
On the other hand, twenty-four state supreme
courts have held that evidence obtained by un-
constitutional search and seizure is admissible,n
while twenty-six state supreme courts have held
that unconstitutionally seized evidence is inad-
missible.N
But whether a state court admits or excludes
evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search
and seizure, it is not certain that the same rule
will be followed in admitting or excluding wiretap
evidence. First, it is not certain because the state
courts have a right to establish their own eviden-
tiary rules provided no federal law is infringed
upon.39 Second, it is not certain because the United
States Supreme Court has held that wiretapping
is not a search and seizure within the meaning of
the fourth amendment to the federal constitu-
tion,40 and a number of state courts have an-
nounced that their search and seizure clauses'
"Whoever; ... taps or connects.., by wire or
any other means whatsoever, to or with any telegraph
or telephone line so as to hear.., any message going
over said line.., or uses, or attempts to use, in any
manner or for any purpose, or communicates in
any way, any information so obtained; ... shall be
punished..."
The statute seems to make divulgence even in court
punishable, and yet, in Griffith v. State, 111 So.2d 282
(Fla.App. 1959) at 287, the court said by way of dictum:
"Our conclusion ... is that evidence obtained
through wiretapping is not inadmissible in evidence
in the state courts of Florida because obtained in
violation of any general principle of law, any federal
or state statutory provision, or the United States
Constitution."
17Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,224-232
(1960) (appendix).
" Ibid.
39 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). See
note 54 infra.
Also, note the dictum in Griffith v. State, 111 So.2d
282, 287 (Fla. App. 1959), which indicates that Florida
would not admit wiretap evidence in court because
the divulgence of wiretap evidence violates the Florida
constitutional provisions stating that no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself. Also, see
MD. AnN. CODE art. 35, §5 (1957), note 46 infra.
10 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
In Olmstead, the wiretapping was done off the defend-
ant's premises. Whether wiretapping while on the
property of the accused (thereby trespassing) con-
stitutes an unreasonable search or seizure within the
meaning of the fourth amendment remains an open
question.
4' Every state constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures. See INDEx DIGEST OF. STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 921 (1959). Most state search and
seizure provisions are similar to the fourth amendment
to the federal constitution which provides that the
people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The majority of state constitutions also provide, as
does the federal constitution, that a search warrant
will issue only upon probable cause supported by oath
[Vol. 51
CRIMINAL LAW COMMENT
are to be interpreted in the same manner as the
federal clause has been interpreted by the federal
courts." Hence, in these states, wiretapping prob-
ably would not be considered a search and seizure.
Other state courts, however, refuse to be bound by
federal interpretations of the fourth amendment
when interpreting analogous clauses in their state
constitutions." But this does not mean that
wiretapping has been or will be construed as con-
stituting any unreasonable search and seizure.
Indeed, no state court has so construed its clause.
Instead, some have indicated that wiretapping
does not fall within the state's constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures."
Whether it be for the reason that wiretapping
or affirmation particularly describing place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized.
4"The 4th Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and Section 22 of the Bill of
Rights of the Florida Constitution are the same in
meaning and almost identical in wording. For this
reason the ruling of the United States Courts on
unreasonable searches is generally accepted as
authority for a similar ruling in Florida." Houston
v. State, 113 So.2d.582, 584-585(Fla. App. 1959).
Also see: Thurman v. State, 116 Fla. 426, 156 So. 484
(1934); State v. Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 Pac. 2
(1930); Applegate v. State ex rel. Bowling, 158 Ind.
119, 63 N.E. 16 (1902).
13 "It is true that we have held in the case of
Malmin v. State, 30 Ariz. 258, 246 P. 548, that
section 8 of article 2 of the Constitution of Arizona
is one of the same general effect and purpose as the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. We have the right, however, to give
such construction to our own constitutional provi-
sions as we think logical and proper, notwithstanding
their analogy to the Federal Constitution and the
federal decisions based on that Constitution." Turley
v. State, 48 Ariz. 61, 70-71, 59 P.2d 312, 316-317
(1936).
Also see Black v. Impelliterri, 201 Misc. 1383, 111
N.Y.S.2d 402 (1952), aft'd, 281 App.Div. 671, 117
N.Y.S.2d 686 (1952), appeal denied, 118 N.Y.S.2d 732
(1953) and People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237, 205 Pac.
435 (1922).
44 1.T]he statutory immunity from unreasonable
searches and seizures relates only to such as are
unreasonable in light of common-law traditions."
Bruce v. Sibeck, 25 Cal.App.2d 691, 697, 78 P.2d
741, 744 (1938).
Also see: People v. Cahan, 40 Cal.App.2d 891, 297
P.2d 715 (1956); Black v. Impelliterri, 201 Misc.
1383, 111 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1952); N.Y. Const. art. I.
§12.
In any event, the state search and seizure provisions
could be somewhat inadequate for the purpose of
preventing wiretapping even if they did cover wire-
tapping, since they are only a restriction on the powers
of the state and do not prohibit searches and seizures
by private persons. See State v. George, 32 Wyo. 223,
231 Pac. 683 (1924) and Imboden v. People, 40 Cal.
142, 90 Pac. 608 (1907).
is not a search or seizure, or for some other reason,
a few states treat wiretap evidence and uncon-
stitutionaly seized evidence quite differently.
Thus, for example, in Nevada, unconstitutionally
seized evidence is admissible, while wiretap evi-
dence is inadmissible except in certain situations
set out in the statute and where wiretapping was
authorized by a court order; 45 in Maryland, un-
constitutionally seized evidence is admissible,
but wiretap evidence is inadmissible unless ob-
tained in conformity with its wiretap statute,
and then only for crimes specified in the court
order;46 in Wisconsin, courts apparently can admit
evidence obtained through illegal means, which
may include wiretapping, but evidence procured
by an unconstitutional search or seizure is in-
admissible;17 in Rhode Island, prior to the 1955
statute which provides that unconstitutionally
seized evidence shall be inadmissible," evidence
obtained by unconstitutional search and seizure
was admissible, but wiretap evidence was by
statute made inadmissible;-9 in Florida, uncon-
stitutionally seized evidence is inadmissible, but
wiretap evidence seems to be admissible. 5'
Neither the federal constitution nor § 605 of the
Federal Communications Act 52 expressly compels
45 State v. Chin Gim, 47 Nev. 431, 224 Pac. 798
(1924); NEv. REv. STAT. §200.680 (1959).
46 Stevens v. State, 202 Md. 117, 95 A.2d 877 (1953);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §97 (1957).
But note MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, §5 (1957) which
requires the exclusion of unconstitutionally seized evi-
dence in the trial of most misdemeanors. The Court in
Hitzelberger v. State, 174 Md. 152, 197 Atl. 605 (1938),
held that §5 did not prevent the admission of evidence
procured through wiretapping since wiretapping was
not a search or seizure. Section 5 provides:
"No evidence in the trial of misdemeanors shall be
deemed admissible where the same shall have been
procured by, through, or in consequence of any
illegal search or seizure or of any search or seizure
prohibited by the Declaration of Rights of this
State; nor shall any evidence in such cases be
admissible if procured by, through, or in conse-
quence of a search and seizure, the effect of the
admission of which would be to compel one to give
evidence against himself in a criminal case."
4 State ex rel. Alford v. Thorson, 202 Wis. 31, 231
N.W. 155 (1930); State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266, 79
N.W.2d 810 (1957).
4' R. I. GEz. LAws AN.N.. §9-19-25(1956).
41 State v. Olynik, 83 R. I. 31, 113 A.2d 123 (1955);
R. I. GEN. LAws AN-N. §11-35-13 (1956).
"0Byrd v. State, 80 So.2d 694 (Fla. 1955); Griffith
v. State, 111 So.2d 282, 287 (Fla. App. 1959) (dictum).
-5 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
- Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); People v.
Onofrio, 65 Cal.App.2d 715, 151 P.2d 158 (1944)!
People v. Vertlieb, 22 Cal.2d 193, 137 P.2d 437 (1943;)
People v. Kelley, 22 Cal.2d 169, 137 P.2d 1, appeal
dismissed, 320 U.S. 715 (1943); Leon v. State, 180 Md.
279, 23 A.2d 706, cert. denied, Neal v. Maryland. 316
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the states to adopt the so-called "federal exclusion-
ary rule" which prohibits federal courts from ad-
mitting wiretap information in evidence. In
Schwartz v. Texas,-- where the defendant, upon evi-
dence obtained by wiretapping, was convicted
in a Texas state court as an accomplice to the
crime of robbery, the United States Supreme Court
held that § 605 did not prohibit the use of wiretap
evidence in a criminal proceeding in a state courtY
Nevertheless, the validity of admitting wiretap
evidence in state courts is extremely uncertain at
the present time. In November, 1959, one Pugach
and others were indicted by the State of New
York for a number of crimes. About two weeks
before the trial was to begin, Pugach brought suit
in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York to enjoin state
officials from making use at the state trial of
evidence obtained by tapping Pugach's telephone
wires in June, 1959, and of evidence obtained by
the use of information overheard in the course of
the tapping. The complaint alleged that, although
the wiretap was obtained pursuant to state court
authorization and in accordance with a state
statute, its divulgence would constitute a violation
of §605 of the Federal Communications Act.
Judge Bryan of the District Court refused to
grant injunctive relief. 55 Upon motion by Pugach,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit stayed the introduction of the wiretap
evidence, pending determination of Pugach's
appeal of the decision denying injunctive relief.
5 6
U.S. 680 (1942); Rowan v. State, 175 Md. 547, 3 A.2d
753 (1939).
344 U.S. 199 (1952).
4 In People v. Dinan, 181 N.Y.S.2d 122, 7 A.D.2d
119 (1958), the New York Court of Appeals, utilizing
the Schwartz decision, held that it could adopt rules of
evidence which are contrary to those adopted by the
federal courts so long as there is no violation of the
federal constitution. Also, in People v. Grant, 14
Misc.2d 182, 179 N.Y.S.2d 384 (1958), the New York
Court specifically held that the Benanti case dealt
solely with the admissibility of wiretap evidence in a
federal court and therefore its holding need not prevent
wiretap evidence from being admitted in state courts.
Also see People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 185 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1959).
'5 Pugach v. Sullivan, 180 F. Supp. 66 (S.D. N.Y.
1960).
56 Pugach v. Dollinger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
Also see Graziano v. McMann, 275 F.2d 284 (2d
Cir. 1960), where the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that the federal wiretapping
ban does not entitle a New York prisoner, against
whom the state had used wiretap evidence obtained
under state law, to federal habeas corpus, basing
their decision on Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
In another recent case, one O'Rourke and others
were on trial in a New York court on an indict-
ment charging them with various crimes. Suit
was brought in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York by these
defendants for the purpose of obtaining an order
enjoining the introduction of wiretap evidence in
the state court, the allegations of the bill being
substantially the same as those in the Pugach case.
Unlike the Pugach situation however, the trial in
the O'Rourke case was already in progress. Judge
Rayfiel of the District Court refused to grant an
injunction and distinguished the grant of the stay
pending the appeal in the Pugach case on the
ground that much greater disruption of the state
court proceeding would result were the introduc-
tion of evidence in a trial already in progress
enjoined.w7 Both the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and Justice Harlan
of the United States Supreme Court, as Circuit
Justice, declined to stay the introduction of the
wiretap evidence pending appeal.w Justice Harlan
said:
"Apart from my general practice as Circuit
justice not to disturb, except upon the weightiest
considerations, interim determinations of the
Court of Appeals in matters pending before it,
it would require the most unequivocal showing
of a right to immediate federal equitable relief
to persuade me to interfere with the conduct of
a criminal trial in a state court. In my opinion
petitioners' ultimate right to relief is far from
clear." 59
With the use of wiretap evidence having been
(1952). Judge Medina, reluctantly concurring, reiter-
ated his position that Congress pre-empted the field of
wiretapping. He further suggested, however, at 286,
that regulated wiretapping, and the use of such evidence
in state courts:
".. . all despite the ruling of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Benanti, 1957, 355 U.S. 96, to the
effect that the entire system is illegal and in violation
of the Federal Communications Act of 1934... and
despite the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2,
U.S. Constitution, may well constitute an invasion
of [the prisoner's] constitutional right to due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment."
See Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 176 Pa. Super. 318,
107 A.2d 214 (1954), however, where the court said
that testimony as to incriminating telephone conversa-
tions of the accused overheard through tapping a
telephone wire did not constitute a violation of the
fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution.
57 O'Rourke v. Levine, 181 F. Supp. 947 (E.D. N.Y.
1960).
a O'Rourke v. Levine, 80 Sup. Ct. 623 (1960).
59 Id. at 623 & 624.
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stayed in the Pugach case but not in the O'Rourke
case, both cases came before the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for deter-
mination of whether a federal court should enjoin
state officers from divulging wiretap evidence in a
state criminal trial. The Court of Appeals, decid-
ing both cases at the same time on April 14, 1960,
denied the request for an injunction in a four to
one decision and held that wiretap evidence could
be used in criminal prosecutions in state courts.60
The Court stated:
"... [W]e do not think that a federal court
should interfere with the prosecution of a state
criminal proceeding in order to provide an
additional means of vindicating any private
rights created by Sec. 605."611
The Court also remarked that while it had power
to grant equitable relief if it saw fit, in this case the
factors weighed more heavily against the use of
its power to grant such relief. The Court further
vacated the stay previously granted by them to
Pugach.
The O'Rourke and Pugach decisions have been
widely interpreted as reaffirming the Schwartz
decision which gave prosecutors permission to use
wiretap evidence in criminal prosecutions in state
courts. But because of the Benanti case, and the
concurring opinion in the Pugach case stating that
"I am not willing to assume that a New York
State trial judgewill permit ... [wiretap] evidence
to be admitted over the objection of defense
counsel... [and i]t is... presumptuous to assume
that any New York State trial judge will acquiesce
to the commission of a crime against the United
States in his presence in his courtroom by a
witness testifying under oath", 2 the County
Court judge in the O'Rourke case subsequently
refused to admit the wiretap information in
evidence even though the Court of Appeals granted
O'Rourke neither a stay nor an injunction as to
the use of wiretap evidence. 3 The judge stated:
"... [T]his Court will not permit any divulg-
ing of wiretap evidence in this trial, for to
permit otherwise would, in the words of Judge
Waterman of the United States Court of Ap-
peals, constitute an 'extraordinary affront' to
the Federal Court."
The judge said that the majority opinion and the
dissent in the Court of Appeals indicated "that
Pugach v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960).
G Id. at 743.
62 Id. at 745.
1 New York Times, 4/20/60.
the court is unanimous and unequivocal in its
opinion that the introduction of wiretap evidence
would constitute a violation of a Federal criminal
statute." Thus the federal court has caused at
least one judge to exclude wiretap evidence intro-
duced in a state court without resorting to express
prohibition of the use of wiretap evidence in state
courts, thereby eliminating open conflict between
the dual sovereigns.
Meanwhile, by orders dated April 26, 1960, and
May 16, 1960, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit continued Pugach's stay, in
the same language as the one it previously vacated,
pending application by Pugach to the Supreme
Court for certiorari6 On June 27, 1960, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
65
Then on July 1, 1960, Pugach submitted a petition
to the United States Court of Appeals alleging
that his trial was commencing and that the trial
judge had denied an application for a preliminary
hearing to determine whether the prosecution
would use evidence derived from leads obtained by
wiretaps. The petition requested that the Court of
Appeals clarify or enlarge the existing order for
stay so that any evidence which resulted directly
or indirectly from information revealed to the
police from their violation of §605 would also be
enjoined from use in the state trial. The Supreme
Court, holding that it had power to grant the
relief sought notwithstanding the grant of certiorari
by the Supreme Court, modified the order to
enjoin the use or disclosure of any evidence obtained
by wiretapping, as well as the intercepted com-
munications themselves, pending final determina-
tion by the United States Supreme Court. 6
As a result of these O'Rourke and Pugach de-
cisions, the validity of the future use of wiretap
evidence in state courts is as uncertain as the
validity of state statutes authorizing limited
wiretapping. Perhaps the United States Supreme
Court will soon clarify certain aspects of the
wiretapping problem in the Pugach case.6 If not,
the law of wiretapping will continue to be in a
confused state primarily because existing legisla-
tion at the state level is badly drafted and out-
dated. Terms are imprecise, and often inapplicable
to modem wiretapping methods. Thus, a statute
64 See Pugach v. Dollinger, 280 F.2d 521, 522 (2d
Cir. 1960).
65 Pugach v. Dollinger, 363 U.S. 836 (1960). See
362 U.S. 980 (1960), where the United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari to O'Rourke.
66 Pugach v. Dollinger, 280 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1960).
6 Pugach v. Dollinger, 363 U.S. 836 (1960).
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prohibiting "connection" or "interception" does
not clearly forbid electronic eavesdropping. Also,
whether physical contact with the wire is required
in order for the statute to apply remains unclear
in most states. 5 There is also the problem of what
a statute means by "divulgence" or "willful
divulgence."6 9 In order to convict someone under
these statutes, the courts must often strain the
meanings of words beyond their intended use.
Many statutes also fail to spell out whether
wiretap evidence divulged in court is excludable or
merely made punishable!' Only seven statutes have
expressly declared whether or not wiretap evidence
is admissible in court.71 As a result, the courts have
had to struggle with the problem of whether to
admit wiretap information in evidence. Those
excluding it were immediately faced with new
problems, such as: whether wiretap evidence
illegally seized by a private party should come
within the rule as well as that illegally seized by
public officials;72 whether the right to object to
the use of intercepted conversations should be
extended to those persons who were implicated
by, but not parties to, the conversation;73 whether
evidence procured by a subscriber by tapping his
own lines should be excluded; whether state officers
handing over illegally seized wiretap evidence to
other state officers for use in other state courts
68 A few statutes clearly do not require physical
contact. See, for example, Io.IAo CoDE AtN. §18-6704
(1948). Also see United States v. Silverman, 166 F.
Supp. 838 (D.C. Cir. 1958), where a federal court held
that the federal wiretapping statute, §605 of the Federal
Communications Act, applies only to physical inter-
ception and does not extent to interception by an
electronic instrument if there is no contact between the
instrument and the means of communication.6
9 Notes 15 & 36 supra.7OIbid.
71 See note 36 supra.
72 See People v. Tarrantino, 45 Cal.2d 590, 290 P.2d
505 (1955).
73 For cases answering in the negative, see Goldstein
v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) and Manger v.
State, 214 Md. 71, 133 A.2d 78 (1957).
should be prosecuted; whether the exclusionary
rule should be limited to prohibiting the govern-
ment from making affirmative use of wiretap
evidence or extended to include a situation in
which such evidence is used to impeach the
accused's testimony; whether the state should
exclude evidence introduced in its courts by
federal officers or officers from other states who
obtained the wiretap evidence illegally but with-
out state aid.
Further inadequacies of the statutes are indi-
cated by the fact that only the Illinois and Pennsyl-
vania statutes are made specifically applicable to
federal officers, and only these same two statutes
expressly provide for civil remedies against wire-
tappers.74
These are but a few of the many problems and
inadequacies of the present law. It is imperative
that the states enact corrective legislation if they
expect to adequately cope with the wiretapping
problem. 75 Any corrective legislation at the state
level should of course be complemented by com-
patible legislation at the national level. It must be
remembered, however, that any corrective legis-
lation must embody the will of the people if it is to
be enforceable, and not merely a dead letter, as is
the case with much of the present law.
ALAN H. SWANSON
71 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§206.1 & 206.3 (1959);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §2443 (1958).
75 One state has attempted to deal with the wiretap-
ping problem through an amendment to its constitution
providing that:
"The right of people to be secure against unreason-
able interception of telephone and telegraph com-
munications shall not be violated, and ex parte
orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or
affirmation that there is reasonable ground to believe
that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and
identifying the particular means of communication,
and particularly describing person or persons whose
communications are to be intercepted and purpose
thereof." N.Y. COXST. art. 1. §12.
[Vol. 51
